Tuesday, November 13, 2018

Corporate Governance by Daley Mok (6/7)

Independent Directors and Corporate Financial Performance – A Hong Kong Perspective (A DBA Dissertation Completed in August 2005)


Chapter 4 – Analysis

 

4.1       Summary of Sampling Results

Statistical testing of the data returned results rejecting the null hypotheses H01 (including both H01a and H01b), H02 and H03. Whereas the outcomes in respect of H02 might be regarded more equivocal than those in respect of the other two hypotheses, the evidence overall has been sufficient to justify acceptance of the thrust of the three alternate hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 that a relationship exists between board composition and corporate financial performance, and that the strength of relationship varies among certain groups of companies, though the strength of relationship found for H3 was in opposite direction to HR3. The three findings are, respectively, the proportion or number of independent directors in the board of directors is positively associated with company financial performance; the relationship between board composition and company financial performance is stronger in growth-oriented companies than non-growth-oriented companies; and the relationship between board composition and company financial performance is stronger in companies majority-owned by mainland Chinese interests than companies majority-owned by non-mainland Chinese interests.

Whilst the 2003 HKEx list of companies included 861 on the Main Board and 187 on the GEM, the following companies were excluded from the sample for analysis:
·         Financial institutions – these are separately regulated by the regulatory bodies, a process which might distort the relationship between independent directors and company financial performance. Any possible relationship might have been moderated or mediated by the additional regulations. Moreover, the components of these companies’ financial statements are different from those of other companies, making, for example, ROA, a less useful comparative measure. This could arise by virtue of the specific line of business of financial institutions which principally involves accepting deposits or premiums to making loans or investments. Consequently, a direct comparison of the accounting returns of financial institutions with those of other industries might be misleading.
·         Companies with missing data including –
o   Those with losses in the previous year, hence for which a meaningful P/E could not be calculated.
o   Those suspended for trading on 24 September 2004, the reference date for market data, or failed to be listed on 24 September 2004, for which MV did not exist.
·         Companies with out-dated financial data – those for which latest published annual reports (when data collection for this study was completed in March 2005) were for years ended earlier than 31 July 2004.

It might be argued, for example, that those companies with losses in the previous year, or suspended from trading on our reference date for market data, were such as a result of bad CG. However, for the sake of validity and reliability, this study required its sample to comprise strictly only companies with comparable data on the same chosen date. Any deviations from that criterion would likely compromise the validity and reliability of its research results. It is, therefore, decided that the aforementioned three groups of companies be excluded from further analysis. After the exclusion, the sample size was 628 (see Table 4.1):

Table 4.1 – Sample Composition
      Company Category
Number
%
Main
Large Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
36
5.7%

Medium Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
115
18.3%

Small Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
295
47.0%
Main & GEM
CEs
78
12.4%

CAs
53
8.4%
GEM
Excl. CEs & CAs
51
8.1%
Total
628
100.0%

 

 

4.2       Hypothesis 1

HR1 states that the proportion or number of independent directors in the board of directors is associated with company financial performance. Conversely, H01 assumes that the proportion or number of independent directors in the board of directors is not associated with company financial performance.

4.2.1    Preliminary Scatterplots

Simple linear regression works well only if the two variables tested have a linear relationship. A scatterplot is capable of revealing the relationship between two variables through the pattern formed by the full set of dots. Therefore, before running regression analyses, as a preliminary test for linear relationship, the whole sample was used to construct the following scatterplots, with % of NEDs, as the x-axis, plotting against ROE, ROA, P/E and MV/BV respectively (see Fig. 4.1):



Figure 4.1 – Scatterplots of the Whole Sample
            Figure 4.1A – ROE versus % of NEDs                  Figure 4.1B – ROA versus % of NEDs

            Figure 4.1C – P/E versus % of NEDs                    Figure 4.1D – MV/BV versus % of NEDs

The four scatterplots in Fig. 4.1 showed that a broadly linear relationship might exist between the independent and dependent variables. It was also apparent that outliers, and in some cases extreme outliers, existed. Outliers are notorious for causing the size of a correlation coefficient to understate or exaggerate the strength of the relationship between two variables (Huck, 2004), and thus cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the issue of outliers will be specifically dealt with in subsequent sections.

4.2.2    Preliminary Descriptive Statistics

It is helpful to gain some basic understanding of the data by exploring their distributional shape, central tendency and dispersion. Some selected descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.2:

Table 4.2 – Descriptive Statistics of the Whole Sample


Table 4.2 reveals that the mean % of NEDs of all the 628 companies was 0.4362 and the mean % of INEDs was 0.3211. The mean No. of NEDs was 3.66 while the mean No. of INEDs was 2.55. The medians of these four proxies for independent director were reasonably close to the means, indicating that the sampling distributions were reasonably symmetric. This was also evident by looking at the skewness figures which ranged from 0.375 to 1.732. The respective standard deviations of these four proxies with symmetric shape are therefore useful indicators.

In contrast, the four proxies for company financial performance skewed far to the right. The means of ROE, ROA, P/E and MV/BV were 0.3108, 0.1575, 53.31 and 1.85, while the respective medians were much lower at 0.0978, 0.514, 12.30 and 1.06. The positive skewness ranging from 12.549 to 24.617 were indeed very high, confirming the existence of extreme outliers. Since all the four proxies were ratios, they could be extremely high were the denominators exceptionally small. Such situations could arise when earnings, equity value or total asset value in the previous financial year were abnormally low, which do happen occasionally in the business world. It is therefore not surprising to find outliers in these variables. For skewed distribution, medians and interquartile ranges are more informative than means and standard deviations.

Despite the existence of outliers, in order to get a complete picture, it is still useful to perform simple linear regression for the whole sample to get a feel for the relationships between the variables.

4.2.3    Preliminary Linear Regression Analyses

All the Main Board and GEM companies were used in running simple linear regressions. As shown in Table 4.3, no significant relationships were identified since all p-values (2-tailed significance level) were greater than 0.05:

Table 4.3 – Preliminary Linear Regression Results

Independent variable
Dependent variable
r
R2
Sig. (2-tailed)
% of NEDs
ROE
-0.025
0.001
0.534

ROA
-0.029
0.001
0.475

P/E
0.013
0.000
0.746

MV/BV of Equity
0.067
0.004
0.094
% of INEDs
ROE
0.008
0.000
0.851

ROA
0.012
0.000
0.762

P/E
-0.013
0.000
0.744

MV/BV of Equity
0.009
0.000
0.818
No. of NEDs
ROE
-0.035
0.001
0.381

ROA
-0.043
0.002
0.288

P/E
0.005
0.000
0.908

MV/BV of Equity
0.050
0.003
0.207
No. of INEDs
ROE
-0.029
0.001
0.469

ROA
-0.032
0.001
0.428

P/E
-0.026
0.001
0.515

MV/BV of Equity
0.007
0.000
0.858


To isolate the effects of size, growth-orientation and shareholder background, the whole sample was divided into different groups for running separate regression analyses. Different groups could then be compared in respect of the strength of relationship between the tested variables. The groups included:
·         Main Board – All Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board – Large Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board – Medium Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board – Small Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         GEM – All Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board – High MV/BV Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board – Low MV/BV Companies (excluding CEs and CAs)
·         Main Board and GEM – CEs
·         Main Board and GEM – CAs

High MV/BV companies were defined for the purposes of this study to delineate those companies with a MV/BV exceeding 3, which represented a high ratio. By implication, low MV/BV companies were those with MV/BV ratios of 3 or less. As such, 52 high MV/BV companies and 394 low MV/BV companies were identified in the 446 non-CE/CA Main Board companies.

No statistically significant relationships were identified in the majority of regression runs. The only significant associations found were in respect of Main Board – Small Companies (excluding CEs and CAs) between % of INEDs and P/E (r = 0.117, p-value = 0.045); Main Board and GEM – CEs between % of NEDs and MV/BV (r = 0.311, p-value = 0.006); Main Board and GEM – CAs between % of NEDs and MV/BV (r = 0.292, p-value = 0.034), as well as between % of INEDs and MV/BV (r = 0.352, p-value = 0.010).

However, these associations must be viewed with caution. As discussed earlier, outliers existed when the whole sample of 628 companies was viewed as a group. Indeed, outliers existed in each of the aforementioned sub-groupings of companies. The presence of outliers could seriously distort the regression line between the independent and dependent variables in each of the company category. The significant relationships identified might not in fact be significant, and the insignificant relationships in the majority of cases might not in fact be the case. As described earlier in Section 4.2.2, the four proxies for company financial performance were ratios, and hence could be extremely high were the denominators exceptionally small. Such situations could arise when earnings, equity value or total asset value in the previous financial year were abnormally low. It is therefore not surprising to find outliers in these variables. However, the presence of these outliers could seriously distort regression results.

4.2.4    Sample Without Outliers

Consequently, all outliers were eliminated for another round of regression analyses. Outliers in this study were defined as data above the upper fence (Q3 + 1.5 x Interquartile Range), or below the lower fence (Q1 – 1.5 x Interquartile Range) in a boxplot. After such elimination, the sample size was reduced from the original 628 companies to as follows (see Table 4.4):


Table 4.4 – Sample Composition Without Outliers

Company Category
Number
%
Main
Large Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
33
6.3%

Medium Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
97
18.6%

Small Companies (excl. CEs & CAs)
238
45.6%
Main & GEM
CEs
68
13.0%

CAs
45
8.6%
GEM
Excl. CEs & CAs
41
7.9%
Total
522
100.0%

 


4.2.5    Scatterplots

The reduced sample was used to construct scatterplots similar to those presented earlier in respect of the original sample, again with % of NEDs, as the x-axis, plotting against ROE, ROA, P/E and MV/BV respectively (see Fig. 4.2):

Figure 4.2 – Scatterplots of the Whole Sample Without Outliers
            Figure 4.2A – ROE versus % of NEDs              Figure 4.2B – ROA versus % of NEDs
            Figure 4.2C – P/E versus % of NEDs                Figure 4.2D – MV/BV versus % of NEDs

Fig. 4.2 reveals no curvilinear or other complex patterns in the scatterplots. As expected, the data were much more clustered together than before the elimination of outliers. Straight line relationships might then be expected to exist.

4.2.6    Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics in a pattern similar to those reported in Section 4.2.2 are shown in Table 4.5:


Table 4.5 – Descriptive Statistics of the Whole Sample Without Outliers

The means and medians of all the variables became reasonably close. Their closeness was supported by the degrees of skewness which ranged from 0.275 to 1.703. That showed that the sampling distributions of all the variables were reasonably symmetric.

4.2.7    Linear Regression Analyses

Compared with the sample before eliminating outliers, many more significant associations, with p-values less than 0.05, were found after simple linear regression runs (see Table 4.6):

Table 4.6 – Linear Regression Results

Company Category
Indep. Var.
Dep. Var.
r
p-value
Main and GEM – All Companies
% of NEDs
P/E
0.162
0.000


MV/BV
0.152
0.000

No. of NEDs
ROE
-0.097
0.026


ROA
-0.096
0.028


P/E
0.268
0.000


MV/BV
0.172
0.000

No. of INEDs
P/E
0.141
0.001
Main Board – All Companies
% of NEDs
ROE
-0.116
0.025
(excl. CEs & Cas)
No. of NEDs
ROE
-0.157
0.002


ROA
-0.142
0.006


P/E
0.236
0.000

No. of INEDs
P/E
0.117
0.025
Main Board – Medium Companies
% of INEDs
ROE
0.245
0.016
(excl. CEs & CAs)

ROA
0.214
0.036
Main Board – Small Companies
% of NEDs
ROE
-0.164
0.011
(excl. CEs & CAs)

MV/BV
-0.181
0.005

No. of NEDs
ROE
-0.218
0.001


ROA
-0.175
0.007


MV/BV
-0.200
0.002

No. of INEDs
ROE
-0.147
0.023


ROA
-0.166
0.010


MV/BV
-0.165
0.011
GEM – All Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
0.332
0.034
(excl. CEs & CAs)
No. of NEDs
MV/BV
0.506
0.001
Main Board – High MV/BV Companies
% of NEDs
P/E
0.325
0.031
(excl. CEs & CAs)
No. of NEDs
P/E
0.355
0.018
Main Board – Low MV/BV Companies
% of NEDs
ROE
-0.143
0.008
(excl. CEs & CAs)

ROA
-0.108
0.046

No. of NEDs
ROE
-0.178
0.001


ROA
-0.144
0.008


P/E
0.217
0.000

No. of INEDs
P/E
0.137
0.011
Main & GEM – CEs
% of NEDs
MV/BV
0.306
0.011
Main & GEM – CAs
% of NEDs
ROE
0.315
0.035


ROA
0.302
0.043


MV/BV
0.318
0.033

% of INEDs
ROE
0.442
0.002


ROA
0.530
0.000

No. of NEDs
MV/BV
0.311
0.038

(Note: R2 not separately shown with p-values lower than 0.05)

Additional scatterplots were drawn in respect of each of the relationship identified above. Other than linear relationship, no evidence suggesting curvilinear or other complex relationships existed.
To further support the existence of linear relationship, it is necessary to check the residuals to ensure they fulfil the assumptions of normality, zero mean, homogeneity of variance and independence (Carver & Nash, 2005). Thus, residuals plots were drawn to examine the appropriateness of the models. In all the identified relationships, the residuals lay along a 45° upward sloping diagonal line in the respective normal probability plots, revealing that the residuals were normally distributed. However, the scatterplots of the standardised residuals compared with the standardised estimated values showed that in most of the identified relationships, the residuals “fanned out” either from left to right or from right to left. These patterns indicated that the homogeneity of variance assumption might have been violated, thus making the models concerned inappropriate. Excluding these “suspicious” cases, the remainder showed residuals randomly scattered in an even, horizontal band around a residual value of zero[1]. These satisfied the four aforementioned assumptions and could therefore be considered reliable. They included (see Table 4.7):

Table 4.7 – Linear Regression Results Satisfying Regression Assumptions

Company Category
Indep. Var.
Dep. Var.
r
p-value
Main and GEM – All Companies
% of NEDs
P/E
0.162
0.000


MV/BV
0.152
0.000
Main Board – Medium Companies
% of INEDs
ROE
0.245
0.016
(excl. CEs & CAs)

ROA
0.214
0.036
GEM – All Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
0.332
0.034
(excl. CEs & CAs)
No. of NEDs
MV/BV
0.506
0.001
Main Board – High MV/BV Companies
% of NEDs
P/E
0.325
0.031
(excl. CEs & CAs)




Main & GEM – CEs
% of NEDs
MV/BV
0.306
0.011
Main & GEM – CAs
% of NEDs
ROE
0.315
0.035


ROA
0.302
0.043


MV/BV
0.318
0.033

% of INEDs
ROE
0.442
0.002


ROA
0.530
0.000


The p-values of these findings were less than 0.05, and indeed in some cases were less than 0.01, hence the first null hypothesis was rejected at a significance level of 5%. In other words, independent directors were found to be associated with company financial performance. It could be seen that the % of NEDs, for listed companies as a whole in Hong Kong, was positively associated with market-based returns including P/E and MV/BV of equity. The % of INEDs for medium-sized companies on the Main Board was positively related to accounting returns including ROE and ROA. Market-based returns were also positively associated with % or No. of NEDs for companies listed on the GEM, high MV/BV Main Board companies and CEs. It is of particular note that for CAs both accounting returns and market-based returns were found to be positively associated with independent directors.

4.3       Hypothesis 2

Since the outliers identified could seriously distort any linear relationship, only the sample excluding outliers was used for further statistical testing of hypotheses HR2 and HR3. The respective correlation coefficients found with GEM companies were compared against those found with Main Board companies, using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. Fisher’s r-to-z transformation is chosen because of its ease of calculation and comprehension. Likewise, high MV/BV Main Board companies, as another proxy for growth-oriented companies, were compared with low MV/BV Main Board companies for sensitivity analysis. In addition, to control for the possible effect of size, GEM companies were separately compared with three sub-groups of Main Board companies, namely, the large, medium, and small. For a two-tailed test, if the absolute value of z is greater than 1.96, a 5% significance level is attained (Bogartz, 1994). The following significant differences were found (see Table 4.8):

Table 4.8 – Z Test between Growth-Oriented Companies and Non-Growth-Oriented Companies


Indep. Var.
Dep. Var.
z value of the difference
GEM with Main – All Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
2.2366
(excluding CEs & CAs)
No. of NEDs
MV/BV
3.0361
GEM with Main – Medium Companies
% of INEDs
ROE
-2.7862
(excluding CEs & CAs)

ROA
-2.2669

No. of NEDs
MV/BV
3.4633
GEM with Main – Small Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
3.0203
(excluding CEs & CAs)
No. of NEDs
ROE
1.9800


ROA
1.9990


MV/BV
4.3471


Overall, the positive relationship between NEDs and MV/BV in GEM companies was significantly stronger than that in Main Board companies as a whole. The same was true between GEM and medium-sized Main Board companies as well as between GEM and small Main-Board companies. The positive association between No. of NEDs and accounting returns was significantly stronger in GEM companies than small Main-Board companies. On the contrary, the positive association between % of INEDs and accounting returns was significantly stronger in medium-sized Main Board companies than GEM companies. However, no significant difference was identified between GEM and large Main Board companies, or between high MV/BV and low MV/BV Main Board companies.

There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to reject the second null hypothesis, though the relationship could be either stronger or weaker in growth-oriented companies than non-growth-oriented companies. Whether the relationship is stronger or weaker is dependent on the size of the non-growth-oriented companies and whether the performance measure was accounting-based or market-based.

4.4       Hypothesis 3

In respect of companies majority-owned by mainland Chineses interests and companies majority-owned by non-mainland Chinese interests, significant differences identified, as represented by z value over 1.96, are tabulated below (see Table 4.9):


Table 4.9 – Z Test between Companies Majority-Owned by Mainland Chinese Interests and Companies Majority-Owned by Non-Mainland Chinese Interests

Groups Concerned
Indep. Var.
Dep. Var.
z value of the difference
CEs with Main – All Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
2.6173
CEs with Main – Small Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
2.8548

No. of NEDs
MV/BV
2.2062
CAs with Main – All Companies
% of NEDs
ROE
3.2897


ROA
2.9277


MV/BV
2.7161

% of INEDs
ROE
3.2755


ROA
4.2153


MV/BV
2.3100

No. of NEDs
ROE
2.5062


ROA
12.4160


MV/BV
2.0932

No. of INEDs
ROE
2.3664


ROA
2.7166


MV/BV
2.0719
CAs with Main – Large Companies
% of INEDs
ROE
3.0692


ROA
3.4095

No. of NEDs
ROA
7.0747

No. of INEDs
ROE
2.1748
CAs with Main – Medium Companies
% of NEDs
MV/BV
1.9863

% of INEDs
ROA
2.3109

No. of NEDs
ROA
9.8166


MV/BV
2.6660

No. of INEDs
MV/BV
2.1811
CAs with Main – Small Companies
% of NEDs
ROE
2.8115


ROA
2.4551


MV/BV
2.9308

% of INEDs
ROE
2.7379


ROA
3.4896

No. of NEDs
ROE
2.2902


ROA
9.7477


MV/BV
2.9991

No. of INEDs
ROE
2.1863


ROA
2.4864


MV/BV
2.6039


The positive relationship between % of NEDs and MV/BV in CEs was significantly stronger than in respect of the Main Board companies in the aggregate. A similar significant difference was identified between CEs and small Main Board companies in relation to NEDs and MV/BV. No other significant difference was found between CEs and Main Board companies of other groupings or in respect of other variables.

Very significant differences in performance relationships were identified when CAs were compared with Main Board companies. The association between independent directors and company financial performance was significantly stronger in CAs than in Main Board companies. The differences were evident in the relationship between virtually all proxies for independent directors and ROE, ROA and MV/BV, when Main Board companies were considered as a whole or divided into sub-groups.

The strong evidence leads to the rejection of H03. It is noteworthy that, contrary to HR3, the positive association between independent directors and company financial performance was significantly stronger in companies majority-owned by mainland Chinese interests than by non-mainland Chinese interests.

The findings will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Conclusions and the ensuing policy implications will also be drawn and explained.



[1] The residual plots can be obtained from the author upon request. They are not annexed to constrain the size of the dissertation.

Corporate Governance by Daley Mok (7/7)


Independent Directors and Corporate Financial Performance – A Hong Kong Perspective (A DBA Dissertation Completed in August 2005)

 

Chapter 5 and References

 

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

 

5.1       Interpretation of Findings

5.1.1    General

The findings of the empirical analysis reveal a positive relationship between independent directors being on company boards and corporate financial performance in the Hong Kong context. In contrast with the conflicting evidence in previous literature, it is useful to point out at the outset that this is consistent with research in the context of New Zealand where the regulatory standards are similar and family-controlled companies dominate the market (Hossain, Prevost & Rao, 2001).

Since past failures of high-profile corporations have been associated with large corporate losses, artificial boosting of corporate profits by accounting manipulations, or both (for example, Peregrine in Hong Kong, HIH and One.Tel in Australia, Enron, WorldCom, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US), it is reasonable to hypothesise that corporate failure is inversely related to corporate financial performance. The relationship in evidence between independent directors being on company boards and superior corporate performance makes rational the further extension – the contention that there would likely be less corporate failures were there more independent directors on company boards.

Nonetheless, the improved corporate financial performance was not evident in all types of companies. Significant positive relationships were seen in medium-sized companies (with market capitalisation from HK$1,000 million to HK$10,000 million), GEM companies, high MV/BV companies (with MV/BV over 3), CEs and CAs. No statistically significant relationships were found in large companies (with market capitalisation over HK$10,000 million), small companies (with market capitalisation less than HK$1,000 million) and low MV/BV companies. It, therefore, seems that applying the same governance standard in respect of independent directors to all companies would not lead uniformly to the same desired result.

This is in line with calls that a one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate (Young, 2003), and that the applicability of governance regimes is idiosyncratic rather than universal. Against that background, it is reasonable to suspect that regulations mandating all companies to adopt particular regimes with respect to board characteristics and membership may lead to suboptimal board structures (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), and unpredictable outcomes.

The improved performance was generally reflected in better market-based returns – higher P/Es, and more markedly in higher MV/BVs. It should be noted again that definitions and operationalizations matter (Daily, Johnson & Dalton, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000), and the specific proxies chosen for independent directors and company financial performance play a pivotal role in identifying possible associations. Though both P/E and MV/BV are market-based returns, this study has revealed more cases with statistical significant relationships in respect of MV/BV than P/E. It was only in medium-sized companies and CAs that higher ROEs and ROAs were evident. Improvement in profitability accounting-wise was generally not as discernible. Hence it might be deduced that the improved performance was more likely due to improved market perception of the values of those companies with the greater number of independent directors present on their company boards.

The enhanced performance was seen to be more related to NEDs than INEDs. Most of the associations found were related to NEDs. Only in the cases of medium-sized companies and CAs were associations found with INEDs. Consequently, it appears that it is the non-executive characteristic of directors that contributes most to the outcome – as long as the added directors are non-executive (INEDs is a subset of NEDs), better financial performance will result. Thus, the emphasis of adding INEDs per se in governance standards might not lead to any additional improved financial performance. Why, is indeterminate. It might, for example, be that truly independent directors are rare in the Hong Kong setting (Chow, 2004a), therefore the impact of (what are described as) INEDs is not significantly different from that of NEDs on enhancing financial performance.

Interestingly, relative measures have emerged more definitive than absolute measures. More obvious associations were found with % of NEDs rather than No. of NEDs. Though both are proxies for the influence of independent directors, this finding implies that the relative proportion of independent directors on company boards has a stronger bearing on financial performance than the absolute number of them. That, perhaps, is understandable in voting settings. This may be the reason why the global trend is more on increasing the proportion of independent directors than the absolute number of them. This is the case for leading stock exchanges including the NYSE, the LSE, as well as the ASX and the two exchanges in mainland China. The HKEx, on the other hand, regulates on the exact number of independent directors.

5.1.2    Growth-orientation of Company

The relationship between NEDs and MV/BV was significantly stronger in GEM companies than Main Board companies. This supports empirical evidence in New Zealand and Australia that the relationship was positive only in companies oriented towards growth (Mak & Roush, 2000; Matolcsy, Stokes & Wright, 2004). More specifically, the significant differences lay between GEM companies and medium-sized Main Board companies, and between GEM companies and small Main Board companies. Distinctively, increasing NEDs makes significantly more contribution towards enhancing market-based returns in GEM companies than in small or medium-sized Main Board companies. Therefore, from the market return perspective, it is important to ensure that the boards of GEM companies have a relatively high proportion of independent directors.

Similarly, the relationship between NEDs and accounting returns was significantly stronger in GEM companies than small Main Board companies. However, in terms of accounting returns, the outcome was different when medium-sized companies were compared with GEM companies. Increasing INEDs in medium-sized Main Board companies was found to lead to significantly higher accounting returns than the same increase in GEM companies. One possible explanation could be that the medium-sized Main Board companies have relatively truly independent directors whose impact is reflected in superior operating results. The boards of the larger companies might have too much clout for their INEDs to be truly independent, whereas the smaller companies might only have nominees as INEDs to fulfil the HKEx’s requirements.

5.1.3    Shareholder Background of Company

No previous research was found in the Hong Kong context (or indeed other contexts) in respect of testing mainland Chinese shareholders against non-mainland Chinese shareholders. This study has revealed significantly stronger association between NEDs and MV/BV for CEs than companies majority-owned by non-mainland Chinese interests. The significant difference lay mainly between CEs and small Main Board companies.

The strongest relationship was found in CAs. A significantly stronger relationship existed between independent directors (including both NEDs and INEDs) and financial performance indicators (including both accounting returns and market-based returns) when CAs were compared with companies majority-owned by non-mainland Chinese interests.

It is therefore apparent that the data support a view that independent directors contributed more towards improving company performance in companies majority-owned by mainland Chinese interests than otherwise. While the contribution in CEs was evident in market perception only, the contribution in CAs comprehensively covered both accounting and market-based returns.

Though, as predicted, there was a significant difference between companies majority-owned by mainland Chinese and companies majority-owned by non-mainland Chinese, this finding was in the opposite direction to what was hypothesised in Chapter 2. A possible explanation could be that independent directors are viewed by the market as relatively more valuable in companies of “lower” governance status, hence their influence on company performance is consequently more profound. In relation to CAs, as they are non-PRC registered companies, they might be more inclined to accepting the management practices prevalent in Hong Kong and in the developed western countries. Therefore the influence of independent directors is not limited to market perception but extended to improving actual operating results as well. There will be more discussions on this in Section 5.3.

5.2       Policy Implications

5.2.1    General

This study demonstrates that independent directors are directly related to corporate financial performance in the Hong Kong context. It provides empirical evidence to support this commonly held belief (Mobius, 2002; Tsui & Gul, 2003), and the broad governance direction that the Hong Kong regulatory bodies are taking towards the compulsory addition of independent directors to company boards.

However, by dividing the companies into different groups to further analyse the relationship, it is obvious that the one-size-fits-all approach does not work – the optimum structure of a corporate board is idiosyncratic, rather than universal – particular companies may not require the greater monitoring by having a higher proportion of outside directors (Mak & Roush, 2000).

Arguably, a one-size-fits-all approach to this aspect of governance only imposes unnecessary costs on firms with the low agency problems characteristically inherent in family-controlled companies. There was, for example, no evidence that large Main Board companies benefited financially from having more independent directors. Similarly, there was no such evidence for small Main Board companies. Indeed, there were some hints in the statistical tests to suggest that independent directors and corporate financial performance were negatively associated for small Main Board companies, though the evidence failed the homogeneity of variance assumption test, and therefore could not be taken to support such a claim.

This point aside, while having the same governance standard for all companies might be seen as fair and equitable on the surface, it might also be argued as unfair and inequitable if the companies regulated do not benefit to the same extent. Even if the additional transaction costs of adding independent directors may be well absorbed by large companies because of their larger scale of operations, the costs may be inappropriately high for small companies. In any event, costs not recovered by the financial value attributed to the ensuing benefits cannot be justified as money well spent.

It is noteworthy that the better financial performance found was in general market-based returns. Only in medium-sized Main Board companies and CAs were higher accounting returns found. Market-based returns are predominantly a function of market perception of a company’s valuation, while accounting returns reveal periodic operating results. Apparently the improvement in financial performance was more because of favourable market sentiment towards companies with additional independent directors than actual improvement in operating results. Nevertheless, higher valuation of a company’s stocks remains a reflection of better company performance.

5.2.2    Relevance of Findings to Existing Regulations

These findings make the HKEx’s focuses on adding INEDs to company boards contestable. It was shown that the strength of relationship lies on NEDs, but as a board component inclusive of their INED members, rather than on INEDs as a separate cohort. Indeed, of the many relationships found, it was only in medium-sized Main Board companies and CAs that significant relationships were evident in relation to INEDs. With respect to enhancing company financial performance, it appears that the thrust should rather be on increasing NEDs than INEDs.

It is noteworthy that contrary to the prevalent global trend on increasing the proportion of independent directors instead of their absolute number, that the HKEx adopts the absolute number approach; indeed, from 1 October 2004, increasing the minimum INEDs each company board has from two to three. This runs counter to the empirical evidence in this study that % of NEDs has stronger relationship with financial performance than No. of NEDs. Accordingly, specifying a minimum percentage threshold of NEDs might be a more prudent policy in terms of achieving better company performance.

5.2.3    Recommendations to Policy Makers

This study has provided insight into the direction of governance policy in respect of companies listed on the HKEx. That policy should bear in mind the following relationships that the study has revealed:
  • a higher % of NEDs in CAs, CEs, GEM companies and high MV/BV Main Board companies was associated with better market-based returns;
  • a higher % of NEDs in CAs was associated with better accounting returns;
  • a higher % of INEDs in medium-sized Main Board companies was associated with better accounting returns;
  • the relationship between NEDs and company financial performance was stronger in GEM companies than others; and
  • the relationship between NEDs and company financial performance was stronger in CAs and CEs than others.

Where the primary objective is to improve corporate financial performance, the findings of this study imply that the following mechanisms for setting governance standards on board independence would be appropriate:
  • excluding CEs and CAs on the Main Board, identify the remaining Main Board companies with MV/BV over 3;
  • excluding CEs and CAs and the High MV/BV Companies on the Main Board, divide the remaining Main Board companies into Large, Medium and Small according to their market capitalisation (the thresholds are respectively over HK$10,000 million, from HK$1,000 million to HK$10,000 million, less than HK$1,000 million);
  • combining the groups identified above with the CEs, CAs and GEM companies that the HKEx currently uses to label its listed entities, all Hong Kong listed companies will fall into one of the following seven categories:
Ø  Main Board – CEs
Ø  Main Board – CAs
Ø  Main Board – High MV/BV Companies
Ø  Main Board – Large Companies
Ø  Main Board – Medium Companies
Ø  Main Board – Small Companies
Ø  GEM Companies;
  • specify a minimum proportion of NEDs in the board of each of the company category. Since positive relationships were found between NEDs and company financial performance in respect of Main Board – CEs, Main Board – CAs, Main Board – High MV/BV Company, Main Board – Medium Companies and GEM Companies, a minimum threshold for proportion of NEDs should be imposed upon them. The mean % of NEDs for all companies in our sample was 0.44, therefore a standard threshold to start with could well be 1/2 which, if needed, can be raised higher perhaps to 2/3 in subsequent years. In relation to Main Board – Large Companies and Main Board – Small Companies, as no significant association was identified, imposing a minimum threshold might only raise unnecessary transaction costs without commensurate benefits. Therefore, no minimum threshold is recommended. Instead, companies in these two categories could be allowed to make their own governance decisions in this respect.

It appears appropriate for the above classification of companies to be reviewed on an annual basis. Though grouping companies as such and assigning the relevant threshold to each category is the preferred approach, understandably such a policy might not be feasible to implement due to political and practical reasons. In those circumstances, a fall-back option is to apply a single threshold to all companies regardless. In any case, using a % of NEDs threshold is preferred to the current requirement of setting a minimum No. of INEDs.

5.3       Generalisability of Results

It has been suggested that the lower the governance standard of a market, the stronger is the relationship between governance and firm value (Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004). In a highly regulated market, the monitoring function of the board of directors could have already been served by the regulatory bodies (Hossain, Prevost & Rao, 2001; Wood & Patrick, 2003). The Hong Kong market is widely perceived to be less regulated than the US or the UK markets. That could be one reason why this study on Hong Kong companies shows a stronger relationship between independent directors and company performance than previous research on US and UK companies.

At the individual company level, the governance standards of GEM companies, CEs and CAs might be less rigid than for other companies listed in Hong Kong. GEM companies face less stringent listing requirements than those of the Main Board, leading some people to view the GEM as a secondary board. GEM companies are generally neophyte companies with a short operating history. For them, CG would, by and large, occupy a lower priority – at least by the board of directors and shareholders – as compared to company survival or growth. With respect to CEs and CAs, their boards of directors are comprised predominantly of mainland Chinese. Understandably, they are generally less acquainted with western-styled management and less sensitive to the CG matters that have so occupied western markets in recent times. By extending the regulatory standard proposition further to the company level, it could be contended that since the governance standards of growth-oriented companies and companies majority-owned by mainland Chinese interests are generally lower than their counterparts, they, therefore, exhibit stronger relationships between independent directors and company performance.

Though the Hong Kong market has its own peculiar characteristics and composition, its governance regulations and CG rating are assessed to be close to those of a number of other Asian countries, particularly the CG regimes observed in Singapore, India, Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia (CLSA, 2003). The increasing weightings of companies with mainland Chinese interests may be limited to the HKEx, yet the characteristic of dominance of family-owned companies is shared by many Asian countries, continental Europe, and New Zealand, and to a lesser degree, Australia. There is a paucity of research in the specific context of the Asian countries just noted, but the findings of this study are generally consistent with prior research done for New Zealand and Australian companies.

This study effectively covers all listed companies in Hong Kong. The research findings have a potential relevance not only to Hong Kong, but also to other markets with similar levels of governance regimes and especially so where companies’ affairs are exposed to the influence of dominant family-owned interests.

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